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HIRING SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS: 
PROBING THE IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE 
BETWEEN JUDGES AND JUSTICES 
LAWRENCE BAUM* 
Since the 1970s, the overwhelming majority of Supreme Court law 
clerks have had prior experience clerking in lower courts, primarily the 
federal courts of appeals.  Throughout that period, there has been a 
tendency for Justices to take clerks from lower court judges who share the 
Justices’ ideological tendencies, in what can be called an ideological 
linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks.  
However, that tendency became considerably stronger between the 1970s 
and 1990s, and it has remained very strong since the 1990s. 
This Article probes the sources of that alteration in the Justices’ 
selection of law clerks.  Although no definitive conclusions are possible, 
two developments seem to be responsible for the change.  The first is 
growing ideological polarization among political elites, which has given 
Justices stronger incentives to seek out law clerks whose policy 
preferences are similar to those of the Justices.  The second is a pair of 
changes in applications for Supreme Court clerkships: a massive increase 
in the numbers of applicants and the development of a practice in which 
applicants apply to all nine Justices.  These changes give the Justices more 
reason to use the identity of the judge with whom an applicant has clerked 
as a source of information about the applicant’s policy preferences.  Thus, 
it appears that a major change in the character of American politics has 
combined with changes in clerkship applications to bring about a 
strengthening of the ideological linkage between judges and Justices in 
clerk selection. 
  
 
*  Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Ohio State University.  This Article draws 
from ideas developed in collaborations with Corey Ditslear and with Neal Devins, and I 
benefited from the excellent research assistance of Cara Schaefer.  I appreciate valuable 
suggestions from Artemus Ward and Orin Kerr. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1970s, nearly all law clerks who serve in the Supreme 
Court have had prior experience clerking for judges on other courts.1  
Since the mid-1990s, these prior clerkships have been heavily 
concentrated in the federal courts of appeals.2  Throughout the period 
 
1.  See Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court 
Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 61–62 (2008). 
2.  Lawrence Baum & Corey Ditslear, Supreme Court Clerkships and “Feeder” Judges, 
31 JUST. SYS. J. 26, 26 (2010).  In the 1975–1984 Terms, 86% of the Supreme Court law clerks 
with lower court experience had worked most recently in the federal courts of appeals.  The 
comparable proportions for later decades were 88% in the 1985–1994 Terms, 98% in the 
1995–2004 Terms, and 96% in the 2005–2014 Terms.  These figures are from analysis of a 
dataset on the backgrounds of Supreme Court law clerks who served in the 1975–2014 Terms 
[hereinafter Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds], one that Corey Ditslear and I compiled from 
two sets of documents on the backgrounds of law clerks provided by the Supreme Court, the 
“Law Clerk Report by Justices” (used for the 1975–1991 Terms) and “Law Clerks—October 
Term [xxxx]: Law Schools and Prior Clerkships” (used for the 1992–2014 Terms).  The “Law 
Clerk Report by Justices” does not include information on some prior clerkships, and other 
sources were checked to identify lower court clerkships for Supreme Court clerks who had no 
such clerkships listed. 
When law clerks worked with more than one lower court judge, the Supreme Court’s 
datasheets in recent years (including the 2010–2014 Terms) have listed only one judge, 
ordinarily the one with the most recent clerkship, and that clerkship was used in the Dataset 
on Clerks’ Backgrounds and treated as the most recent one for clerks with multiple lower-
court clerkships.  It is possible that in some instances the clerkship listed in the Court’s 
datasheets and, thus included in the Dataset, is not the most recent one for a Supreme Court 
clerk.  In some earlier years the Court’s datasheets listed multiple judges with whom a clerk 
worked; in those instances, the most recent clerkship was included in the Dataset.  Law clerks 
who worked with multiple Justices were counted only for the first Justice with whom they 
served.  Clerks who worked with a court of appeals judge and then with the same person as a 
Supreme Court Justice were not counted.  Nor were clerks who worked with retired Justices.  
It should be noted that because only a single judge is included in the Dataset for each clerk, 
and because not all missing data could be filled in from other sources, the numbers of 
Supreme Court clerks that are given for specific lower-court judges later in the Article might 
be slight undercounts.  See infra notes 35–37, 42.  Although it appears that there were few 
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from the mid-1970s to the present, there has been a tendency for liberal 
Justices to hire clerks whose lower court service was with liberal judges 
and a corresponding tendency for conservative Justices.3  This tendency, 
which I will call an ideological linkage between judges and Justices in 
the selection of law clerks, grew considerably stronger over time, with 
the largest increase coming in the early 1990s.4  It has remained very 
strong since that time.5 
This Article explores the reasons for this strengthening.  Why have 
Justices become more inclined to draw law clerks from ideologically 
similar judges?  This change in the Justices’ approach to the selection of 
law clerks provides a window on the Court as an institution and the way 
it has evolved. 
The Article does not reach a firm conclusion about the sources of 
this change because the implications of the available evidence are 
uncertain.  But I suggest that two intertwined factors are responsible for 
the change.  One factor is the growing ideological polarization of elite 
groups in American society, polarization that affects the thinking of 
Supreme Court Justices, lower court judges, and aspirants to clerkships.6  
The other factor is growth in the numbers of applications for clerkships 
that each Justice receives and one specific source of that growth: the 
development of a practice in which prospective clerks apply to all nine 
Justices.7   
In Part II, I describe the existence and strengthening of the 
ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law 
clerks.  In Part III, I discuss reasons why an ideological linkage might 
exist.  In Part IV, I examine the evidence on explanations for the 
strengthening of this ideological linkage and offer a tentative judgment 
on the sources of that development.  In Part V, I briefly discuss the 
implications of the strengthening of the ideological linkage. 
 
errors in the listings of prior clerkships in the two sets of Supreme Court documents, any 
errors that do exist could affect the numbers of clerks for specific judges as well as the data in 
Table 1 infra. 
3.  See infra Part II. 
4.  See infra Part II. 
5.  See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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II. PATTERNS OF IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE 
In 2001, Corey Ditslear and I reported a study of the relationship 
between the ideological positions of Supreme Court Justices and the 
positions of the judges from whom they drew their clerks in the 1975–
1998 Terms.8  Using two measures of the Justices’ ideological positions 
and two measures of the judges’ positions, and controlling for the 
partisan composition of the courts of appeals, we found a strong and 
statistically significant relationship between judges and Justices.9  In 
other words, the more liberal the Justice, the more liberal the lower 
court judges whose clerks the Justice chose. 
This finding was not surprising.  But it was striking that by all our 
measures of ideology, the ideological linkage between judges and 
Justices became much stronger over time, with the last part of our study 
period (the 1993–1998 Terms) standing out from earlier parts.10  When 
we analyzed clerk selection by individual Justices over time, we found 
that the strengthening of the ideological linkage reflected both 
differences between the selection practices of Justices who came on to 
the Court in the late 1980s and early 1990s and those of their 
predecessors, and changes in the practices of Justices who had joined the 
Court prior to the late 1980s.11 
In a second study, reported in 2010, we focused on the Justices’ 
relationships with “feeder” judges who supplied substantial numbers of 
law clerks (for most purposes, ten clerks in a decade) to the Supreme 
Court.12  Our analytic approach was designed for periods of stable 
membership on the Court, so our primary comparison was between the 
1976–1985 Terms (when eight Justices served throughout the period) 
 
8.  Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Research Note, Selection of Law Clerks and 
Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001). 
9.  Id. at 873–75.  This study and a follow-up study that focused on “feeder” judges 
analyzed the hiring of individual clerks by Justices.  See Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2.  A 
useful alternative approach is to consider the attributes of the sets of clerks that a Justice 
hires in a given Term.  See Christopher D. Kromphardt, Fielding an Excellent Team: Law 
Clerk Selection and Chambers Structure at the U.S. Supreme Court, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 
298–301 (2014). 
10.  Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 875–77.  When the ideological positions of court 
of appeals judges were measured by the party of the appointing president, “there was a fairly 
sharp break: beginning with the 1992 term, the relationship between judges’ and justices’ 
ideological positions was consistently at a level of strength that was matched by few prior 
terms.”  Id. at 882. 
11.  Id. at 880–82. 
12.  Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2. 
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and the 1995–2004 Terms (when nine Justices served throughout the 
period).13  We used four measures of judges’ ideological positions and 
four measures of Justices’ positions.14  When we examined only those 
clerks whom the Justices drew from feeder judges, the ideological 
linkage between judges and Justices was only moderately strong in the 
1976–1985 Terms.15  In the 1995–2004 Terms, in contrast, the 
relationships were very strong.16  Compared with the earlier period, 
feeder judges were sending clerks to smaller subsets of Justices, and 
those subsets overwhelmingly were composed of Justices who shared 
the judges’ ideological tendencies.17 
The ideological linkage in the selection of law clerks has remained 
strong since those studies were carried out.18  Table 1 shows the 
proportion of each Justice’s law clerks in the 2010–2014 Terms who had 
worked most recently with a judge appointed by a Democratic 
president, an imperfect but quite meaningful measure of judges’ 
ideological positions.19  The gap between the four liberal Justices 
appointed by Democratic presidents and the five conservative Justices 
appointed by Republicans is striking.  So are the very low percentages 
for all five conservative Justices, who were distinctly less likely to choose 
clerks who had worked with lower court judges from the opposite party 
than were their liberal colleagues.  In the 2010–2014 Terms, 32.1% of 
the clerks for the four liberal Justices came from Republican judges, 
while 8.0% of the clerks for the five conservative Justices came from 
 
13.  Id. at 28.  We did not include the first Term in these two periods of stable 
membership because Justices’ approach to clerk selection in the first Term often differs from 
their approach in later Terms.  Id. at 28 n.1. 
14.  Id. at 36–37. 
15.  Id. at 37. 
16.  Id. at 37–38. 
17.  Id. at 38–40. 
18.  See William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The 
Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation?, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1766–68, 1775–80 (2009); Adam Liptak, A Sign of Court’s Polarization: 
Choice of Clerks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at A1; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Difference 
Between Conservative and Liberal Justices, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2013, 7:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/the-difference-between-co_b_4205674.html 
(last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 10:52 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/TRU4-BZRS. 
19.  However, because of partisan “sorting,” which has made each party more 
ideologically homogeneous, some caution is needed in interpreting changes in the 
relationship between judges’ party affiliations and the ideological positions of the Justices to 
whom they supply clerks.  See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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Democratic judges.20  Indeed, prior to the 2013 Term, Clarence Thomas 
as a Supreme Court Justice apparently had never hired a clerk who had 
worked with a Democratic-appointed judge.21  When Justice Thomas 
broke that perfect record, it was with a clerk who had been president of 
the Yale Federalist Society.22 
Table 1 
Percentages of Justices’ Law Clerks with Lower Court Clerkships 
Who Had Worked with Democratic-Appointed Judges,  
2010–2014 Terms23 
Justice Percent
Sotomayor 70.0
Kagan 70.0
Ginsburg 68.4
 
20.  Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2.  To a limited degree, the fact that the 
conservative Republican Justices hired substantially higher percentages of clerks from fellow 
partisans in these five Terms than did their liberal Democratic counterparts might be ascribed 
to the higher numbers of Republican appointees in the courts of appeals early in that period.  
Maxwell Palmer, Presidential Legacies and Partisan Balance on the Federal Courts 19 tbl.3, 
27 fig.7, 29 fig.8 (Nov. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://maxwellpalmer.co
m/research.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4VGY-ZQUE.  However, this difference 
between conservative and liberal Justices was essentially unchanged after appointments by 
President Obama moved the courts of appeals toward a more even party balance.  Id.  In the 
2013 and 2014 Terms, 32.3% of the clerks for the four liberal Justices came from Republican 
judges, while 10.0% of the clerks for the five conservative Justices came from Democratic 
judges.  Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2.  In January 2009, about 60% of the 
active court of appeals judges had been appointed by Republican presidents; in January 2013, 
the percentage had declined to 51%.  Palmer, supra at 29 fig.8. 
21.  Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2; see also Adam Liptak, The Polarized 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, at SR1.  Because the Supreme Court’s information sheets 
on law clerks list only a single prior clerkship, usually the most recent, it is possible that one 
or more of Justice Thomas’s clerks prior to the 2013 Term had served with a Democratic-
appointed judge at some point.  See supra note 2. 
22.  David Lat, Supreme Court Clerk Hiring Watch: The Official List for October Term 
2013, ABOVE THE LAW (July 25, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/supreme-
court-clerk-hiring-watch-the-official-list-for-october-term-2013/#more-256382, archived at htt
p://perma.cc/NV9Q-HD7A.  
23.  Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2.  One clerk for Justice Breyer and 
one clerk for Justice Ginsburg who had served in a state supreme court are not included in 
the percentages for them.  On possible minor errors in the source documents on which the 
Dataset is based, see supra note 2. 
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Breyer 63.2
Kennedy 20.0
Roberts 15.0
Thomas 5.0
Alito 0.0
Scalia 0.0
As a first step in explaining the strengthening of the ideological 
linkage between Justices and judges in the selection of law clerks, it is 
necessary to consider why any ideological linkage might exist.  Why do 
Justices draw clerks disproportionately from ideological compatriots in 
the lower courts?   
III. BASES FOR IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE 
The most straightforward reason why Supreme Court Justices might 
draw law clerks disproportionately from like-minded lower court judges 
is an interest on the part of prospective clerks, judges, and Justices in 
working with people who share their conceptions of good legal policy.24  
Law students with strong policy preferences might focus their search for 
their first clerkships on judges who stand on the same side of the 
ideological spectrum.  Indeed, there is evidence that at least some 
applicants for lower court clerkships take judges’ ideological positions 
into account when they apply for clerkships and accept them.25  When 
lower court clerks seek promotion to the Supreme Court, they could use 
the same criterion to choose where to send their applications.26  The 
result would be to create an ideological linkage between the judges and 
Justices with whom clerks worked. 
 
24.  See Liptak, supra note 18. 
25.  See Rex Bossert, Clerks’ Route to Top Court, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at A1.  But 
see Alex Kozinski & Fred Bernstein, Clerkship Politics, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 57, 57–58 (1998) 
(Judge Kozinski noting that many prospective clerks do not take judges’ ideological positions 
into account). 
26.  As I will discuss later, applicants for Supreme Court clerkships no longer apply 
selectively to the Justices, and that change in practice helps to explain the strengthened 
ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks.  See infra notes 
103–08 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, it is easy to understand why judges and Justices might 
prefer to work with law clerks who share their policy preferences.  The 
role of law clerks in the Supreme Court became increasingly important 
over time, especially in the selection of cases to hear and in opinion 
writing.27  A Justice wants clerks to act in ways that are consistent with 
the Justice’s preferences, and a clerk whose own preferences mirror 
those of the Justice is the safest bet from that perspective.28  Caseload 
growth in the federal courts of appeals enhanced the role of law clerks 
in those courts, and court of appeals judges also have reason to choose 
clerks who share their preferences.29  Further, judges and Justices might 
want to give the valuable experience and career enhancement of a 
clerkship primarily to young lawyers who stand on their own side of the 
ideological spectrum.30  Thus, although judges undoubtedly vary in this 
respect,31 almost surely there is a tendency for judges and Justices to 
choose law clerks whose policy preferences seem fairly close to their 
own.32 
 
27.  See Liptak, supra note 18. 
28.  Id. 
29.  See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 3 (2013); Liptak, supra note 18; Orin 
Kerr, Are Feeder Judges Unusually Ideological? If So, Why?, U. CHI. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 28, 20
06), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/09/are_feeder_judg.html, archived at http://p
erma.cc/M5CY-3BNW. 
30.  Kozinski & Bernstein, supra note 25, at 58 (Judge Kozinski describing his own 
desire “to train conservative and libertarian lawyers” and his colleague Stephen Reinhardt’s 
corresponding motivation to train “committed liberals”).  Orin Kerr has suggested another 
incentive: judges might choose clerks from their own side of the ideological spectrum as part 
of a strategy to place those clerks with Justices who are also on that side.  Personal 
Communication with Orin Kerr, Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor of Law, George 
Washington Univ. (May 5, 2014); see also Kerr, supra note 29. 
31.  JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 303 (2007) (describing 
differences in hiring practices between Justice Samuel Alito and J. Michael Luttig as courts of 
appeals judges). 
32.  See Kerr, supra note 29.  In a 2013 survey of courts of appeals judges, the 
respondents ranked the political ideology of applicants as the least important of several 
possible criteria for the selection of law clerks.  Todd C. Peppers, Micheal W. Giles & Bridget 
Tainer-Parkins, Surgeons or Scribes? The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks 
in “Appellate Triage,” 98 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 325 tbl.1 (2014).  But this finding led the 
authors who conducted the survey “to speculate about the level of judicial candor reflected in 
[their] completed surveys.  Simply put, [they] believe that there is too much ideological 
matching between courts of appeals judges and their law clerks to be the result of chance or 
applicants applying to like-minded jurists.”  Id. at 319. 
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To the extent that both judges and Justices use ideology as a 
criterion in the selection of clerks, there will be an indirect ideological 
linkage between judges and Justices in the selection process.  If liberal 
judges and Justices both seek liberal clerks, then liberal Justices will 
take clerks disproportionately from liberal judges.  And this will occur 
even if Justices pay no attention to the identity of the judge with whom a 
clerk works.33 
In practice, Justices undoubtedly do take the identities of lower 
court judges into account.  For one thing, if judges and prospective 
clerks seek each other out partly on the basis of shared policy 
preferences, a Justice might use the ideological position of a judge as 
one clue to the ideological position of the judge’s clerks.  Further, if a 
clerk has already completed the lower court clerkship or a substantial 
portion of the clerkship when a Justice makes hiring decisions, a lower 
court judge who shares a Justice’s ideological views can offer concrete 
evidence on the clerk’s own views and the clerk’s willingness to follow 
the judge’s lead. 
Justices might choose clerks who have worked with judges who are 
ideologically similar to the Justices for reasons that relate to those 
judges themselves rather than to their clerks.  It is natural for Justices to 
draw clerks from judges with whom they are acquainted, even more if 
they have a friendship with each other.  One benefit of going to those 
judges is that it is easier for Justices to inquire about a clerk’s qualities 
with a judge they know well.  Further, judges’ success in placing clerks 
with the Supreme Court has intangible benefits in pride and prestige as 
well as the tangible benefit of enhancing judges’ ability to attract the 
most sought-after clerks,34 so Justices may be inclined to give those 
benefits to people they know and like. 
The feeder relationships between judges and specific Justices 
provide ample evidence of the effect of acquaintanceship.  Justices draw 
clerks from former court of appeals colleagues,35 former colleagues in 
 
33.  The same is true if prospective clerks seek out both judges and Justices on an 
ideological basis.  
34.  SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 246–
47 (2010); Bossert, supra note 25 (quoting Judge Kozinski); see also Tony Mauro, Corps of 
Clerks Lacking in Diversity, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 12A. 
35.  To take one example, Justice Stephen Breyer has hired eleven clerks who worked 
with Judge Michael Boudin, a colleague of Justice Breyer’s on the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit between 1992 and 1994.  Boudin’s and Breyer’s career information is in the 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges.  Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Michael 
Boudin, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=218&cid=999&ctype=n
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law practice,36 and former law clerks of their own.37  In part, the success 
of District of Columbia judges in placing clerks with the Supreme 
Court38 reflects the advantages of D.C. judges in developing 
relationships with Justices.39 
The judges whom Justices know and like do not necessarily share 
ideological positions with them.40  But there is undoubtedly a tendency 
in that direction.41  Future judges and Justices sometimes get to know 
 
a&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FUP2-R9US; 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Stephen Gerald Breyer, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://w
ww.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=255&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S7T3-FN7F.  The number of Boudin clerks that Justice 
Breyer selected is from the Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2 (which also 
describes the possibility of a slight undercount). 
36.  Justice Thurgood Marshall hired at least five clerks who worked with Judge 
Spottswood Robinson of the D.C. Circuit, who worked with the NAACP and its Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund while in private practice from 1948 to 1960.  Justice Marshall 
headed the Legal Defense and Educational Fund from 1940 to 1961.  Biographical Directory 
of Federal Judges: Thurgood Marshall, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInf
o?jid=1489&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.cc/P3G9-WQR9; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Spottswood William Robinson 
III, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2031&cid=999&ctype=na&i
nstate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3JCL-BGN5.  The number 
of Robinson clerks that Justice Marshall selected is from the Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, 
supra note 2 (which also describes the possibility of a slight undercount).  One of the five 
clerks worked with Justice Marshall in the 1974 Term, prior to the beginning date for the 
Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, and Justice Marshall might have hired other Robinson 
clerks in earlier Terms for which the Supreme Court’s datasheet “Law Clerk Report by 
Justices” did not list prior clerkships. 
37.  Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, who worked with Judge Anthony Kennedy of 
the Ninth Circuit as clerk in 1975–1976, has provided twenty-six clerks to Kennedy as a 
Justice.  Former Fourth Circuit Judge J. Michael Luttig, who worked with Judge Antonin 
Scalia of the D.C. Circuit as clerk in 1982–1983, provided fifteen clerks to Scalia as a Justice.  
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Alex Kozinski, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.g
ov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1314&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/CW3F-F7X8; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: J. Michael 
Luttig, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1443&cid=999&ctype=na
&instate=na (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F6JW-T9YM.  The 
numbers of clerks are from the Dataset on Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2 (which also 
describes the possibility of slight undercounts). 
38.  In the 1975–2014 Terms, 36% of all the Supreme Court law clerks whose most 
recent clerkship was in a federal court of appeals came from the D.C. Circuit.  Dataset on 
Clerks’ Backgrounds, supra note 2.  The next highest percentage was 14% from the Second 
Circuit.  Id. 
39.  The prestige of the D.C. Circuit is also a factor.  ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. 
WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 80 (2006).  
40.  See Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 871. 
41.  Id. 
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each other in an ideologically defined setting such as a presidential 
administration or a political group.  Further, people with strong views 
about public policy are drawn disproportionately to others who share 
those views. 
Acquaintanceship aside, Justices may be inclined to choose clerks on 
the basis of their respect for the judges with whom those clerks serve.  
To take the most prominent example, that respect surely helps to 
explain the number of clerks for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit who have gone on to the Supreme 
Court.42  The esteem in which Justices hold other judges may be colored 
by their agreement or disagreement with those judges on matters of 
judicial policy. 
Thus, there is a multiplicity of bases for an ideological linkage 
between judges and Justices in the clerk selection process.  In light of 
the number of bases, it would be extraordinary if that linkage did not 
exist.  These bases provide a starting point for examination of the 
reasons why the ideological linkage has strengthened over time.  
IV. EXPLAINING THE STRENGTHENED LINKAGE 
Why did Supreme Court Justices become more inclined to draw 
their law clerks from judges who shared the Justices’ general ideological 
positions in the 1990s, and why have they maintained that stronger 
inclination since then?  The most intriguing possibility is the growth in 
ideological polarization among political elites in the United States. 
The term polarization has been used to refer to multiple 
phenomena.43  One is “sorting,” in which ideological differences become 
more fully aligned with other differences between people, especially 
political party identifications and affiliations.  Considerable sorting of 
liberals into the Democratic Party and conservatives into the 
Republican Party has taken place in the mass public44 and a great deal of 
 
42.  Twenty-six Posner clerks have served in the Supreme Court.  Dataset on Clerks’ 
Backgrounds, supra note 2 (which also describes the possibility of a slight undercount).  Judge 
Posner’s standing is discussed in Christopher C. McCurdy & Ryan P. Thompson, The Power 
of Posner: A Study of Prestige and Influence in the Federal Judiciary, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 49 
(2011). 
43.  On different aspects of polarization and the evidence of their existence at the elite 
and mass levels, see MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS, DISCONNECT: THE 
BREAKDOWN OF REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2009); Marc J. Hetherington, 
Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 413 (2009).  
44.  There is considerable evidence of sorting in the mass public.  See MATTHEW 
LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND 
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sorting has occurred among people in government and other people who 
are involved in politics.45  In Congress, the sorting began in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and it is now complete: in the Congresses of 2009–2010 and 
2011–2012, in both the House and Senate every Democrat had a more 
liberal voting record than every Republican.46  Similarly, since the 
retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010, the Supreme Court for 
the first time has had ideological blocs that follow party lines (based on 
the party of the appointing president) perfectly.47  To the extent that 
partisan divisions reinforce ideological divisions, the Court’s liberal and 
conservative Justices are separated from each other to a greater extent 
than in the past.48 
In itself, partisan sorting could not explain the strengthened 
ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law 
 
CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS (2009); Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, 
Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 
114 AM. J. SOC. 408 (2008); see also Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political 
Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563, 577–82 (2008) (discussing 
the evidence and disagreements about the extent of the sorting that has occurred). 
45.  Baldassarri & Gelman, supra note 44, at 413.  
46.  On congressional sorting generally, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & 
HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL 
RICHES 15–70 (2006); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008).  
The relative positions of Republican and Democratic members in 2009–2012 were 
determined from “DW-Nominate” scores for members of Congress, also known as Poole-
Rosenthal scores, that are calculated from agreements and disagreements between members 
in congressional votes.  Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis, James Lo, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole & 
Howard Rosenthal, DW-Nominate Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, VOTEVIEW, 
http://pooleandrosenthal.com/dwnominate.asp (last updated Feb. 17, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YQ2U-M8RL (describing the scores and presenting the data). 
47.  Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the 
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court 7–10 (William & Mary Law Sch., Research Paper No. 
09-276, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432111, archived at http://perma.cc/DS9X
-VFEN.  There has been no other time when there were sizable conservative and liberal blocs 
on the Court that followed party lines and only one ambiguous instance in which all the 
Court’s Democratic appointees were to the left of all the Republican appointees.  Id. at 10–
27.  In the 1941–1944 Terms, the Justice with the most conservative voting position on the 
Court (Owen Roberts) was the only “pure” Republican appointee on the Court; Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone, originally appointed to the Court by Republican Calvin Coolidge and 
elevated to chief by Democrat Franklin Roosevelt, had the second most conservative position 
in two of the four Terms.  Id. at 18 tbl.2, 21.  The Justices’ places on a liberal–conservative 
scale for the 1937–2012 Terms were determined from their Martin-Quinn scores, a 
transformation of their voting agreements and disagreements.  Id. at 16.  The scores are 
described and archived at Martin-Quinn Scores, BERKELEY L., http://mqscores.berkeley.edu 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/MZA5-KKBJ.  
48.  Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 7–27; see also Liptak, supra note 18. 
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clerks.49  More relevant is another type of polarization: growth in the 
strength of people’s identifications with one ideological side and in their 
antipathy toward the other side.  This second type has been called 
“affective polarization.”50 
It is uncertain whether affective ideological polarization has 
occurred in the mass public,51 but there are clear signs of it among 
political elites.52  One reason is that, with the two parties more 
ideologically distinct, partisan loyalties and interests reinforce 
ideological disagreements.53  In any event, there is now an extraordinary 
degree of enmity and distrust between conservatives and liberals.54  
Justice Scalia has described one result:  
It’s a nasty time.  When I was first in Washington, and even in 
my early years on this Court, I used to go to a lot of dinner 
parties at which there were people from both sides.  Democrats, 
Republicans.  Katharine Graham used to have dinner parties 
 
49.  Partisan sorting could explain a growing tendency of Justices to go to judges 
appointed by presidents of their own party as sources of clerks: if the ideological linkage 
remained at the same strength but the political parties became more homogeneous 
ideologically, the proportion of clerks that Justices drew from judges of the same party would 
increase.  But the studies of ideological linkage did not use party affiliation (or party of the 
appointing president) as a measure of the Justices’ ideological positions, and the linkage 
strengthened over time whether lower court judges’ positions were measured by the party of 
the appointing president or by other measures.  Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2, at 37–38; 
Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 875–76. 
 It is also noteworthy that the most prominent feeder judges since the 1990s seem less 
moderate in their views than their counterparts in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  On the 
feeders of the earlier period, see Baum & Ditslear, supra note 2, at 37–39.  On the feeders 
since the 1980s, see David J. Garrow, Acolytes in Arms, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 411, 417–18 (2006) 
(reviewing PEPPERS, supra note 95; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 59).  But see Kerr, supra 
note 29, disagreeing in part with Garrow’s characterization of these judges.  In conjunction 
with the strengthened tendency of conservative and liberal Justices to draw their clerks from 
different feeder judges, this change provides additional evidence that something more than 
partisan sorting is involved in the changing linkage between judges and Justices in the 
selection of law clerks. 
50.  Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social 
Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 406 (2012).  These authors 
focused on affect as a source of partisan polarization, distinguishing it from ideology, but 
affect is relevant to ideological polarization as well.  See id. 
51.  Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes see ideology as largely irrelevant to the growth in 
affective polarization along partisan lines.  Id. at 421–24.  
52.  See id. at 405–06. 
53.  Id. at 421.  
54.  THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: 
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM 44–51, 55–67 (2012). 
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that really were quite representative of Washington.  It doesn’t 
happen anymore.55 
This development is reflected in, and reinforced by, the 
establishment of new ideologically based institutions.  In the mass 
media, television networks and websites cater separately to liberals and 
conservatives.  In the legal profession, the Federalist Society and (more 
recently) the American Constitution Society provide separate homes for 
conservative and liberal law students, lawyers, and even judges.  
If the thinking of Justices, judges, and prospective law clerks has 
changed as a result of affective polarization, the result would be to 
strengthen the ideological linkage between judges and Justices in the 
selection of law clerks in multiple ways.  For one thing, law students who 
have stronger identifications with one ideological side would give 
greater weight to the ideological positions of lower court judges when 
they seek clerkships.56  Justices would also have reason to worry more 
about the danger of hiring clerks who seek to advance their own 
ideological agendas, so they would have a stronger incentive to seek 
clerks who share the Justices’ own views.57 
Further, if judges have stronger ideological identities than they did 
in the past, they too give greater weight to ideology in the selection of 
clerks.  In combination with clerks’ own choices about where to apply 
for clerkships, this change in behavior makes a judge’s identity a better 
indicator of clerks’ ideological positions for Justices who care about 
those positions.  
Especially intriguing is the possibility that Justices’ own perspectives 
have changed.  If Justices have become more conscious of ideology, they 
have stronger incentives to choose law clerks who share their ideological 
positions.  In turn, they have more reason to draw clerks from the lower 
court judges whose own ideological positions provide information about 
clerks’ positions.  Former U.S. Court of Appeals Judge J. Michael Luttig 
has argued that these changes have indeed occurred, ascribing them to 
 
55.  Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 14, 2013, at 22, 
27.  Katharine Graham was publisher and chaired the board of the Washington Post.   
56.  See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.  
57.  In the 1990s, one judge on a federal court of appeals expressed his concern about 
“the risk of staff disloyalty” from law clerks who disagree with the judges with whom they 
work, citing examples passed along by other judges.  Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Politicization: 
From the Law Schools to the Courts, 7 ACAD. QUESTIONS 9, 16 (1994).  Judge Kleinfeld 
linked such behavior to “politicization” of law schools.  Id. at 13. 
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what he calls politicization of the courts.58  Justices would also have 
more interest in rewarding ideologically similar lower court judges by 
choosing their clerks.  Finally, the Justices might be more likely to 
develop acquaintanceships with judges and accord respect to them on 
the basis of ideological compatibility. 
Thus, affective ideological polarization provides a potentially 
powerful explanation for the strengthened ideological linkage between 
judges and Justices in the selection of Supreme Court law clerks.  The 
evidence on whether the changes associated with affective polarization 
have actually occurred is fragmentary, but that evidence can be used to 
reach tentative conclusions about the validity of an explanation based 
on polarization. 
A. The Case for Polarization as an Explanation 
There is no systematic evidence on ideological thinking among 
applicants for clerkships and among those who actually serve in the 
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.  But it seems certain that law 
students and young lawyers in the most prestigious law schools have 
been affected by the growth in ideological polarization.  The 
establishment of the Federalist Society in the 1980s59 undoubtedly 
strengthened the ideological identities of conservative law students, and 
the same has been true of liberals and the American Constitution 
Society in the past decade.60  Indeed, some of the law clerks who have 
worked with the conservative Justices since the 1980s were already 
visible participants in conservative politics by the time they came to the 
Court.61 
As the hypothesis of greater ideological consciousness might suggest, 
accounts from the 1988 and 2000 Terms of the Court depict strong 
rivalries between sets of conservative and liberal law clerks.62  Although 
 
58.  Liptak, supra note 18. 
59.  On the development of the Federalist Society, see MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE 
MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK 
FROM LIBERALS (2013); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 135–80 (2008).  
60.  On the American Constitution Society, see Charlie Savage, Liberal Legal Group is 
Following New Administration’s Path to Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at A30. 
61.  See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
62.  The 1988 Term is discussed in EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE 
FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 263–
71 (1998).  Some commentators have questioned Lazarus’s depiction of the Court and of the 
clerks’ role, though not (to my knowledge) the existence of ideological rivalries among the 
 
 348 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:333 
such accounts must be interpreted with caution, they are consistent with 
the possibility that law clerks in the Court act more deliberately to 
advance legal policies they favor than in the past.  If so, Justices have a 
strong incentive to choose clerks who will be on their own side of the 
divide. 
It seems reasonable to posit that ideological thinking among lower 
court judges, and specifically judges on the federal courts of appeals, has 
also strengthened.  In selecting judges, presidents today generally give 
more emphasis to the policy preferences of prospective nominees than 
they did in the mid-twentieth century.63  Responding in part to activists 
in their party coalitions, the Reagan Administration and its successors 
have elevated policy considerations in their criteria for selection of 
judges.64  One indication is the importance of Federalist Society 
membership as a qualification for Republican nominees.65  Both for this 
reason, and because of the ideological polarization that has occurred all 
around them, judges on the courts of appeals in the current era are more 
ideologically committed as a group than were their predecessors in 
earlier eras.  
Similarly, Justices of the current era surely have been affected by 
ideological polarization.66  For one thing, the forces that have led recent 
presidents to choose Justices who share their parties’ now-dominant 
ideological orientations have also led to the selection of Justices whose 
liberalism or conservatism is deeply rooted.67  This development is 
especially clear on the Republican side.  Chief Justice John Roberts and 
 
clerks.  See Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents?  What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds to 
Our Understanding of Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 193–
211, 218–219, 221 (2000) (book review).  The 2000 Term is discussed in David Margolick, 
Evgenia Peretz & Michael Shnayerson, The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310, 
320. 
63.  NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER 
FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 28, 46 (2005). 
64.  See id. at 51. 
65.  Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on the Federal 
Judiciary, 62 POL. RES. Q. 366, 367–68, 375 (2009).  One commentator, in 1998, reported his 
observation that some Republican appointees in the federal judiciary were affiliated with the 
Federalist Society and that they and their Federalist-affiliated law clerks “form a loose knit 
ideological unity within the court system.”  Lawrence E. Walsh, The Future of the 
Independent Counsel Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1379, 1389. 
66.  The impact of polarization on the Court, including some of the effects discussed 
here, is analyzed in Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, 
Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L.J. 661, 693–704 
(2013). 
67.  See id.  
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Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito were all 
highly committed conservatives when they were chosen as Justices.68 
Further, ideological polarization among political and social elites has 
changed the environment in which Justices live and work.69  To a great 
extent, that environment has bifurcated.  As noted earlier, there are now 
separate segments of the mass media and the legal elite on the left and 
right, and law schools differ sharply in their ideological orientations.  As 
Justice Scalia pointed out, even socializing in Washington, D.C. now 
tends to be within ideological subgroups.70  As a result, it is easier for 
Justices to live in an environment consisting primarily of people who 
share their own views.71 
Indeed, the strongly conservative members of today’s Court have 
had significant ties with conservatives outside the Court.  Justices 
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, all members of the 
Federalist Society before their appointments to the Court, have each 
participated in Society events multiple times as Justices, and Chief 
Justice John Roberts also has links to the Society.72  Justices Scalia and 
Thomas frequently appear before other conservative groups as well.73  
Justice Scalia’s deep conservative roots include a role in founding the 
Federalist Society,74 and he has indicated his disdain for what he regards 
as the orthodoxy of a liberal elite.75  For his part, Justice Thomas has 
 
68.  Based on references to Supreme Court nominees’ ideological positions in 
newspaper editorials, all four of these Justices were perceived as highly conservative.  On a 
scale of 0 (very conservative) to 1 (very liberal), Justice Scalia was rated at .000, Justice 
Thomas at .160, Justice Roberts at .120, and Justice Alito at .100.  The scores, calculated by 
Jeffrey Segal, are in the table Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court 
Nominees, 1937–2012.  JEFFREY SEGAL, PERCEIVED QUALIFICATIONS AND IDEOLOGY OF 
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES: 1937−2012, available at http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/
polisci/jsegal/QualTable.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PGC5-S3QG.  The derivation and 
use of the scores are discussed in Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and 
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 560 tbl.1 (1989). 
69.  See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.  
70.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
71.  Of course, even in the past it was possible for Justices to do so.  On Justice Brennan 
in the 1970s, see STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 34, at 425. 
72.  Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 64–67; see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Absolutist, 
NEW YORKER, June 30, 2014, at 34, 44 (discussing Justice Alito). 
73.  Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 64–66. 
74.  TELES, supra note 59, at 141. 
75.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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openly expressed his bitterness toward what he sees as a liberal 
establishment.76 
As Table 1 shows, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy all 
take their clerks preponderantly from Republican appointees in the 
lower courts.77  The clerks for each of the four Justices have included 
people who already had visible involvement in conservative causes.78  
During much of his tenure on the Court, those who help Justice 
Kennedy select clerks have made a considerable effort to screen out 
applicants with liberal views.79  Justice Scalia has been open to clerks 
with liberal views, but he recently expressed his view that it is difficult to 
find liberals who are willing to follow his jurisprudential approach.80  
Justice Thomas has argued that it is pointless for him to select clerks 
who disagree with his conservative views,81 and he has explained his 
preference for conservative judges as sources of clerks by saying that 
choosing clerks is like “selecting mates [for] a foxhole.”82 
The links between liberal Justices and liberal groups outside the 
Court have not been as prominent.  In part, this is because some 
important institutions that do not have an explicit ideological 
 
76.  Jeffrey Toobin, The Burden of Clarence Thomas, NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 1993, at 
38, 39–40; see also Neil A. Lewis, 2 Years After His Bruising Hearing, Justice Thomas Can 
Rarely Be Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at 7. 
77.  See supra Table 1.  
78.  Al Kamen, Scalia’s Federalist from Justice, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1986, at A23; 
Adam Liptak, New Clerk for Alito Has a Long Paper Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at C14; 
Tony Mauro, A New Clerk, a “Vanilla” Face, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 15, 1988, at 16 (discussing 
Justice Kennedy); Toobin, supra note 76, at 46–47 (discussing Justice Thomas). 
79.  Margolick et al., supra note 62, at 320; Jack Newfield, The Right’s Judicial 
Juggernaut, NATION, Oct. 7, 2002, at 11, 15.  In the 2002 confirmation hearings for Miguel 
Estrada, nominated to a seat on the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, reports that 
Estrada had blocked liberal candidates for clerkships with Justice Kennedy were raised by 
Democratic senators and largely denied by Estrada.  Confirmation Hearings on Federal 
Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 779–80, 802–03, 
805–08 (2002).  
80.  Senior, supra note 55, at 28. 
81.  Michael A. Fletcher & Kevin Merida, Culling the Reputable, Reliable, Right-
Leaning: For “Family” of Clerks, Thomas Weighs Politics, Loyalty and, Sometimes, Hard-
Luck History, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A11 (“I’m not going to hire clerks who have 
profound disagreements with me . . . .  That is a waste of my time.  Someone said that is like 
trying to train a pig.  It’s a waste of your time, and it aggravates the pig.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
82.  Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 883.  In that source, Justice Thomas is quoted as 
referring to “mates in a foxhole”; that was my error in transcribing the quotation from my 
notes on Justice Thomas’s response to a question in an appearance at Texas A & M 
University, Oct. 22, 1999.  See id at 833 n.7. 
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orientation, such as the American Bar Association, are friendly to 
liberal views.83  But the involvement of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor in the American Constitution 
Society84 is a sign that the liberal Justices, too, orient themselves toward 
a liberal audience.  And as dean of Harvard Law School, Justice Elena 
Kagan made her perspective clear when she told a national student 
convention of the Federalist Society, “I love the Federalist Society” but 
added, “[y]ou are not my people.”85 
Thus, there is reason to think that affective ideological polarization 
among American elites has helped to reorient the Justices’ criteria for 
selection of clerks.  On average, prospective law clerks, lower court 
judges, and the Justices themselves almost surely are more committed to 
conservatism or liberalism than their counterparts in earlier eras.86  That 
commitment inevitably affects the selection of law clerks, including the 
Justices’ consideration of the identities of the judges with whom those 
clerks worked.  It is noteworthy that conservative Justices have an 
especially strong tendency to choose clerks from judges on their side of 
the ideological divide because ideological consciousness seems 
especially strong among conservative Justices.  Thus, affective 
polarization is a persuasive explanation for the strengthening of the 
ideological link between judges and Justices. 
B. The Case for a More Complex Explanation 
Though persuasive in itself, an explanation based on polarization 
may exaggerate how much Supreme Court Justices and others involved 
in the selection of law clerks have changed.  To start with, this is hardly 
the first era in which some prospective law clerks and lower court judges 
have adhered firmly to ideological positions.  Certainly that is true of 
judges.  As people who are politically aware and who generally had 
been politically active, federal judges were always likely to have strong 
views about policy issues and, in some cases, strong self-identifications 
 
83.  Adam Liptak, As the Bar Gets Its Voice Back on Judges, Advice May Ring Familiar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, at A14. 
84.  Devins & Baum, supra note 47, at 72 n.331 (discussing Justices Breyer and 
Ginsburg); Andrew Hamm, Justice Sotomayor Speaks at ACS Convention, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 24, 2014, 10:41 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/justice-sotomayor-speaks-at-
acs-convention/, archived at http://perma.cc/G9KY-JGDN. 
85.  MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 
90 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
86.  See Ditslear & Baum, supra note 8, at 869–80. 
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as liberals or conservatives.  And if enmity between judges with 
different ideological views seems to be a phenomenon of the current 
era, it is useful to cite the sharp divide between liberals and 
conservatives on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the 
1960s.87 
What about the Justices?  In some important respects, the Court of 
the last quarter century does not seem especially polarized by historical 
standards.  The massive growth in the proportions of non-unanimous 
decisions and in the occurrence of separate opinions that began in the 
late 1930s was completed by the time the Justices began to draw the 
preponderance of their clerks from lower courts in the 1970s.88  
Measured by the proportions of their votes that can be characterized as 
conservative or liberal, the Justices have not become more divided over 
the past quarter century.89  Although the Justices’ frequent references to 
a friendly atmosphere in the Court90 might be discounted, there is no 
 
87.  That divide was so sharp that a judge who sought to avoid identification with one 
camp or the other had to walk to another federal building for lunch to avoid choosing 
between the separate groups of conservative and liberal judges in the judges’ dining room.  
JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE POWERFUL 
FEDERAL JUDGES 253 (1974).  
88.  See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. 
WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 
225–36 (4th ed. 2007) (showing term-by-term proportions of unanimous decisions, decisions 
with dissenting opinions, and decisions with concurring opinions); Peppers & Zorn, supra 
note 1, at 61–62. 
89.  The standard deviation measures the spread of a set of numbers, so it provides a 
good indication of the variation in the Justices’ proportions of liberal and conservative votes 
by Term.  There is no clear trend across the 1975–2012 Terms, though there was a slight 
decline over time that indicated the Justices were a bit closer to each other in voting 
tendencies.  The mean of the standard deviations by decade was 15.3% for the 1975–1984 
Terms, 15.1% for the 1985–1994 Terms, 14.3% for the 1995–2004 Terms, and 13.5% for the 
2005–2012 Terms.  Percentages of liberal and conservative votes were calculated from data in 
the Supreme Court Database, archived at Washington University.  Harold J. Spaeth, Lee 
Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger & Sara C. Benesh, 2014 
Supreme Court Database, Version 2014 Release 01, THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL 
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SD8F-2K9R.  The cases analyzed were those in which the Court held oral 
arguments; the percentages used to calculate the standard deviation were for the nine Justices 
who participated in the largest number of cases in a Term.  In a study that covered the 1953–
2004 period, different measures of polarization showed different patterns, but none indicated 
a sharp increase in polarization over time.  Tom S. Clark, Measuring Ideological Polarization 
on the United States Supreme Court, 62 POL. RES. Q. 146, 150, 152 fig.3 (2009). 
90.  Senior, supra note 55, at 27 (Justice Scalia: “Everybody I’ve served with on the 
Court I’ve regarded as a friend.”); Mike Tolson, Chief Justice Roberts: Technology Among 
Top Issues for Court, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct 17, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
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visible evidence that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have had the 
very bad interpersonal relations of some past Courts.91 
Nor are the Justices of the current era the first to display behavior 
that is motivated consciously or unconsciously by ideological 
considerations.  To take one example, what some observers have read as 
a strategic effort by Chief Justice Roberts to move doctrine in a 
conservative direction92 could hardly be more conscious or elaborate 
than the efforts of Justice William Brennan to win his colleagues’ 
support for liberal doctrine in an earlier era.93  And if judges and 
Justices today are more likely to be acquainted if they share an 
ideological position, that tendency surely existed in prior eras as well.  
One example was the close relationship between some liberals on the 
Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 
the 1960s and 1970s.94 
The most striking evidence of continuity between current and past 
eras comes from the surveys of former law clerks by Todd Peppers and 
Christopher Zorn95 and by Artemus Ward and David Weiden,96 surveys 
 
texas/houston/article/Chief-Justice-Roberts-Technology-among-top-3957626.php (last 
updated Oct. 17, 2012, 11:22 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/XX9C-82MC (“We are 
extremely close . . . .  I was surprised by the extent to which the justices have a collegial 
relationship.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kagan Praises Scalia for Work on 
Supreme Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Dec. 13, 2012, 
10:23 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kagan-praises-scalia-work-supreme-court, archived at 
http://perma.cc/F5V4-K83V (“Kagan says she loves all her colleagues.”). 
91.  On the Court of the 1940s, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND 
TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 305–06 (2010).  Some journalists 
have pointed to signs of frictions among the current Justices.  See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Justices’ 
Jabs Reveal Ideological Rifts, USA TODAY, May 13, 2014, at 2A; Jan Crawford, Discord at 
Supreme Court is Deep, and Personal, CBS NEWS (July 9, 2012, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/discord-at-supreme-court-is-deep-and-personal/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BY33-9Z44.  But to the extent that these conflicts exist, they seem to pale in 
comparison with those of some past eras. 
92.  See Linda Greenhouse, The Cost of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR 
(July 10, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-cost-of-compro
mise/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/68QK-JLFG; Richard A. 
Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling is about the Conservative Imagination, SLATE 
(June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_tab
le/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking
_down_the_law_is_all.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5UD-3P7V. 
93.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 34, at 155–56, 197, 250–51, 383. 
94.  See Philip Taubman, Milton Kronheim’s, Where the Justices Adjourn for Lunch, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1979, at 36 (discussing frequent lunches attended by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall and D.C. Circuit Judges Bazelon and Wright).  
95.  TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 34–37 (2006); Peppers & Zorn, supra 
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that found strong statistical relationships between the ideological 
positions of Justices and the self-reported positions or partisan loyalties 
of their clerks.97  Collectively, the respondents to these surveys served in 
the Court over a long period of time, and the great majority of the 
respondents served before the time that the ideological linkage between 
judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks strengthened.98   
Undoubtedly, the relationship between Justices’ and clerks’ views in 
past eras had multiple sources.  It stemmed in part from selectivity by 
prospective clerks about where to send their applications.99  For their 
part, the people who helped Justices select clerks (or, in some instances, 
who selected clerks themselves) sometimes used ideological criteria 
based on what they thought Justices wanted.100  Finally, Justices’ own 
preferences surely played a direct role in producing the correlation 
between the views of Justices and the views of their law clerks.  Indeed, 
there is scattered but substantial evidence that some Justices of past eras 
sought out clerks who shared their ideological positions.101 
Thus, there is some reason to doubt that affective polarization fully 
accounts for the strengthening of the ideological linkage between judges 
and Justices in the selection of law clerks.  But what else could have 
helped bring about this change?  The most likely candidate is changes in 
 
note 1, at 63–70.  The Peppers and Zorn article reported the results of the survey reported in 
the Peppers book, combined with a survey of law clerks who served in the 2001–2004 period. 
96.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 103–07. 
97.  See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34–36; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105 
tbl.2.17 & fig.2.3; Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 63, 64 fig.2. 
98.  See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34 (noting that respondents to the survey reported in 
the book served during the period between 1940 and 2000 and that clerks whose Justices were 
deceased responded at a higher rate); WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 10 (noting that 
respondents served as law clerks during the period from the 1930s to the late 1990s); id. at 104 
(showing that among the clerks who worked with Justices for whom at least five law clerks 
responded to a question about their ideological position, 93 of 107 served with Justices whose 
service ended in 1986 or earlier); Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that the law 
clerks who were surveyed served between 1940 and 2004).  The sharpest increase in the 
strength of the relationship between Justices’ and judges’ ideological positions came in the 
1990s.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
99.  PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 57–58. 
100.  PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 120, 147–48, 152. 
101.  See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 147–48 (Chief Justice Warren); id. at 134 (Chief 
Justice Vinson); WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 101, 105 tbl.2.7 & fig.2.3 (Justice 
Douglas); id. at 103, 105 tbl.2.7 & fig.2.3  (Justice Brennan); Sean Donahue, Behind the Pillars 
of Justice: Remarks on Law Clerks, 3 LONG TERM VIEW 77, 78 (1995) (noting “[a] few 
Justices”).  
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applications for Supreme Court law clerkships.102 
There has been a massive growth in the number of applications for 
clerkships that each Justice receives, from the few dozen a year that 
some Justices reported in the late 1950s and early 1960s to something 
like one thousand today.103  Thus, the Justices are more dependent on 
others, such as current law clerks, to help them choose from the 
applicants.  Further, the Justices and those who help them face a far 
more daunting task than they did in the past.  As a result, information 
about applicants that is both relevant and readily ascertained has 
become more valuable.  One such piece of information is the identity of 
the lower court judge with whom an applicant has worked. 
For the most part, the growth in the numbers of applications to each 
Justice reflects a larger number of people who apply for clerkships.  But 
there has also been a change in the numbers of Justices to whom 
aspiring clerks apply.  For most of the time that Justices have employed 
law clerks, prospective clerks (or the law professor sponsors who acted 
on their behalf) applied to only a subset of the Justices, a subset chosen 
in part on the basis of ideological preferences.104  But the growing 
attractiveness of clerkships impelled aspirants to apply to larger 
numbers of Justices, and it is now both standard practice and a norm to 
send applications to all nine Justices.105 
The exact timing of this change is uncertain, but data on the clerks 
who worked with Justice Blackmun provide some sense of when it 
became nearly complete.106  The clerks of the 1975–1985 Terms applied 
to a mean of 6.8 Justices; the clerks of the 1986–1993 Terms applied to a 
mean of 7.4.107  Although this is not a very large increase, the median 
number of applications increased from 7 to 9.108  In other words, the 
most common practice for the applicants who became Blackmun clerks 
changed from omitting a few Justices to omitting none. 
 
102.  The discussion of the impact of change in application processes that follows draws 
much from suggestions to me by Artemus Ward.  See also WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, 
at 106–07. 
103.  Id. at 56–58.  
104.  See supra note 99.  
105.  PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 58–59; Tom 
McCann, Clerks See Life on the Inside of the U.S. Supreme Court, CHI. LAW., Sept. 
2003, at 20, 21. 
106.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 59. 
107.  Id. at 59 tbl.2.I 
108.  Id. 
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As discussed earlier, Justices may be attracted to the clerks of judges 
whom they know personally and whom they respect highly.109  To the 
extent that acquaintanceship and respect are products of ideological 
agreement, increased reliance on the identity of lower court judges as a 
basis for selection of law clerks would strengthen the ideological linkage 
between judges and Justices in the selection process. 
Meanwhile, once it became standard practice for aspirants to apply 
to every member of the Court, a Justice could no longer infer from an 
application that a prospective clerk agreed (or at least did not strongly 
disagree) with the Justice’s views about public policy.  In the absence of 
changes in Justices’ ways of gathering information, the result might be to 
reduce ideological agreement between Justices and their clerks.110  To 
the extent that Justices care about such agreement, they must make 
effective use of any available information sources.  In the current era, 
the ideological positions of some applicants are apparent from 
membership in the Federalist Society or the American Constitution 
Society or from other activities listed on their résumé.  For other 
applicants, the judge with whom a clerk has worked can provide 
valuable information.  If a Justice knows that a particular judge is 
careful to choose only conservative clerks, for instance, the identity of 
the judge tells a Justice a good deal.  Further, a Justice can consult with 
an ideologically similar judge to get assurance about a clerk’s views. 
The same is true of the people who help Justices select their law 
clerks.  Current clerks or committees of former clerks might have direct 
knowledge about the ideological positions of applicants.111  Their help 
could make Justices less reliant on information such as the identity of 
the judge with whom an applicant has worked.  But these helpers may 
themselves give considerable weight to that type of information.  
Further, current and former clerks may help to perpetuate an 
ideological linkage that already exists by favoring applicants who 
worked with the same judge they did and whose ideological reliability 
they can infer from that service. 
Thus, a movement away from ideological behavior in applications 
for clerkships to the Justices has given the Justices reason to engage in a 
different form of ideological behavior, going to like-minded lower court 
 
109.  See supra Part III.   
110.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 106–07. 
111.  Id. at 60–65. 
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judges as sources of law clerks.112  Further, the broader growth in the 
number of applications makes readily ascertainable information such as 
the identity of the judge with whom an applicant has clerked more 
valuable.113  If an applicant has no obvious markers of ideological 
position, such as membership in the Federalist Society, and if the people 
who help Justices select clerks have no personal knowledge of 
applicants’ positions, the judge’s identity serves as a good substitute. 
The relative importance of these two changes in applications—
growth in the number of applications and in the number of Justices to 
whom aspirants apply—cannot be determined with certainty.  Indeed, 
an argument could be made for the dominance of either change.  But 
the more persuasive argument may be for the second change.  When 
prospective clerks applied selectively, Justices and those who help them 
select clerks could infer that applicants saw themselves as ideologically 
compatible with the Justices they selected.  Once it became the standard 
practice to apply to all the Justices, that inference was no longer 
possible.  In turn, other sources of information on ideological 
compatibility, including the identity of the judge with whom an 
applicant worked, became considerably more valuable. 
No matter which of these changes was more important, the two 
changes appear to be an important cause of the strengthened ideological 
linkage between judges and Justices.  But are they the only source of 
that strengthening?  
I think the answer is no.  For one thing, in light of the affective 
polarization that has occurred among elites in general, it seems unlikely 
that students at the most prestigious law schools and federal judges—
including Supreme Court Justices—have been immune to that 
polarization. 
Further, there is some suggestive evidence that the clerks who work 
with liberal and conservative Justices in the current era differ from each 
other more sharply than did their counterparts in past eras.  The surveys 
by Peppers and Zorn and by Ward and Weiden found statistical 
relationships between the ideological positions of the Justices and the 
positions and party affiliations of the law clerks who worked with them 
in past eras.114  But the surveys also found that the law clerks as a group 
 
112.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
113.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 58. 
114.  See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35–37; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105 
tbl.2.17 & fig.2.3; Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 63–64. 
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in these past eras leaned toward the left.115  Indeed, among the Justices 
for whom there were sufficient survey responses from former clerks to 
be included in tables, the more conservative Justices typically had a 
majority of clerks who identified themselves as Democrats—in some 
instances, a large majority.116  Similarly, the mean ideological position of 
the clerks who worked with most of the conservative Justices was to the 
left of center.117  In light of the expressed preferences of some of today’s 
conservative Justices for conservative clerks118 and the backgrounds of 
some of those clerks,119 it seems very likely that their clerks as a group 
are predominantly Republican and conservative.120  It might well be that 
the more conservative Justices of the 1950s and the 1970s were relatively 
moderate compared with today’s conservatives.  Even so, it appears that 
there is a closer ideological match between Justices and clerks today 
than there was in those earlier eras.121 
Also relevant are the patterns of post-Court careers for law clerks, 
compiled and analyzed by William Nelson and his colleagues.122   Their 
study found that in the current era, unlike past eras, there is a strong 
tendency for the clerks who work with conservative and liberal Justices 
to take different career paths after their service on the Court.123  Clerks 
for liberal Justices tend to go to positions in elite law schools, 
Democratic administrations, and law firms with liberal orientations; 
clerks for conservative Justices tend to go to Republican administrations 
and firms with conservative orientations.124  Because of this 
development, the study authors note, clerks for liberal and conservative 
Justices now tend to differ in the ideological coloration of what they do 
 
115.  See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105 
tbl.2.17; Peppers & Zorn, supra note 1, at 60. 
116.  See PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 34–35, 37 tbl.2.8. 
117.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 104 tbl.2.16, 105 tbl.2.17. 
118.  See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
119.  See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
120.  It is noteworthy that Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the one strongly 
conservative Justice in the two books’ listings who served into the 1990s, was also the only 
Justice who had a majority of Republican law clerks and the only one whose clerks leaned 
distinctly to the conservative side of the ideological spectrum.  PEPPERS, supra note 95, at 35, 
37 tbl.2.8; see WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 39, at 105 tbl.2.17. 
121.  See Liptak, supra note 18. 
122.  Nelson et al., supra note 18, at 1780–95. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
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both before they get to the Court (including the ideological orientations 
of the lower court judges they serve) and after they leave it.125 
These pieces of evidence certainly are not conclusive.  But they 
suggest that the clerks who work with liberal Justices and those who 
work with conservative Justices have become more distinct from each 
other in ideological terms.  That development probably could not have 
occurred unless Justices gave more weight to ideology in their selection 
of law clerks, and increased reliance on the ideological positions of 
lower court judges as a criterion for selection would be an attractive 
means to that end. 
Thus, while no definitive answer is possible, I think that both 
affective polarization and changes in the numbers of applications for 
clerkships and the application practices of aspiring Supreme Court law 
clerks help to account for the strengthened ideological linkage between 
judges and Justices.  If that judgment is accurate, it is likely that these 
two sources have reinforced each other rather than operating separately.  
That reinforcement could help to explain what has been a quite 
substantial change in the Justices’ own practices in the selection of law 
clerks. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The tendency for Supreme Court Justices to draw their law clerks 
from ideologically compatible lower court judges became considerably 
stronger by the 1990s, and that tendency has remained very strong since 
then.126  Regardless of how the strengthened ideological linkage between 
judges and Justices is best explained, it is striking that the Justices of the 
last two decades have drawn their law clerks so heavily from lower court 
judges who share their general ideological positions.127  This reliance 
strongly suggests that the Justices (or, at least, most of the Justices) 
think of themselves as standing on one ideological side or the other, and 
it suggests as well that they care a good deal about choosing clerks who 
share their point of view. 
 
125.  Id. at 1797–98. 
126.  See supra Part II. 
127.  See supra Part III. 
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If at least some Justices and their clerks function in part as an 
ideological team,128 one result might be to heighten Justices’ reluctance 
to deviate from the positions that are identified with their side of the 
ideological spectrum in the cases that have the highest stakes for 
conservatives and liberals within and outside the Court.  Another result 
might be that Justices and their clerks encourage each other to take 
uncompromising stands and to proclaim a Justice’s disagreements with 
colleagues in strong terms,129 thereby exacerbating conflicts within the 
Court.  These possibilities are speculative, but they merit consideration. 
The Justices’ selection of law clerks and the ways they employ their 
clerks also merit consideration for the window that they provide on the 
functioning of the Court.  Law clerks are important participants in the 
process of reaching decisions in the Court.130  For this reason, the 
Justices’ choices concerning their clerks also tell us something about the 
goals they seek to advance and the ways that they see their roles.  As I 
have suggested in this Article, the development of a strong ideological 
linkage between judges and Justices in the selection of law clerks tells us 
something as well about the impact on the Court of changes in the world 
of political and social elites in which both Justices and law clerks reside. 
 
128  Some Justices appear to favor ideologically diverse sets of law clerks in a given Term 
rather than sets in which all the clerks have the same ideological leanings as that of the Justice.  
Kromphardt, supra note 9, at 309–10. 
129.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 34, at 350–51, 438–39, 478–79 (discussing 
interactions between Justice Brennan and his clerks); see also Kenney, supra note 62, at 221. 
130.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
